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Abstract. This paper presents liveness properties that need to be pre-
served by Event-B models of distributed systems. Event-B is a formal
technique for development of models of distributed systems related via
renement. In this paper we outline how enabledness preservation and
non-divergence are related to the liveness properties of the B models of
the distributed systems. We address the liveness issues related to our
model of distributed transactions and outline the construction of proof
obligations that need to be discharged to ensure liveness.
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1 Introduction
Distributed systems are hard to understand and verify due to complex execu-
tion paths and unanticipated behavior. A rigorous reasoning of these systems is
required to precisely understand behavior of such systems. Safety and liveness
are two important issues in the development of the distributed systems [9]. The
distinction between safety and liveness properties is motivated by dierent tools
and techniques for proving them and various interpretations of these properties
are discussed in [8]. Informally, as described in [9], the safety property expresses
that something bad will not happen during a system execution. A liveness prop-
erty expresses that something good will eventually happen.
Event-B [10], a variant of classical B [1], is a formal technique for develop-
ing models of distributed systems. Event-B supports renement and provides a
complete framework for development of models of distributed systems. Exist-
ing B tools provides an environment for the generation of proof obligations for
consistency and renement checking and to discharge them. This technique con-
sists of rst describing the abstract problem, introducing solutions or details in
renement steps to obtain more concrete specications and verifying that pro-
posed solutions are valid. A specic development in this approach is made of a
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series of more and more rened models. Each model is made of static properties
(invariants) and dynamic properties (events). A list of state variables is modi-
ed by activation of nite list of events. The events are guarded by predicates
and these guards may be strengthened at each renement step. An approach
to incremental design of distributed systems and guidelines for construction of
Event-B models are outlined in [3{5].
Existing B tools provide a strong proof support to aid reasoning about the
safety properties by generating the proof obligations and providing an environ-
ment to discharge the proof obligations. In addition to the safety properties, it
is also useful to verify that the models of distributed systems are live. In this
paper we outline issues related to liveness in Event-B models and present the
guidelines to address these issues in the Event-B development of the distributed
systems. A case study of distributed transactions [11] for replicated database is
used to outline construction of proof obligations.
2 Safety and Liveness in the Event-B Models
With regard to the safety, the most important property which we want to prove
about the models of distributed systems is invariant preservation. The invariant
is a condition which must hold permanently on the state variables. By invariant
preservation we mean proving that the actions of the events do not violate the
invariants. Existing B tools generate proof obligations for following.
1. Consistency Checking : Consistency of a machine is established by proving
that the actions associated with each event modies the variables in such
a way that the invariants are preserved under the hypothesis that the in-
variants hold initially and the guards are true. Discharging proof obligations
generated due to consistency checking proves that the machine is consistent
with respect to the invariants.
2. Renement Checking : The renement of a machine consists of rening its
state and events. The gluing invariants relate the state of the renement,
represented by the concrete variables, to the abstract state represented by
the abstract variables. An event in the abstraction may be rened by one or
more events, and discharging proof obligations generated due to renement
checking ensure that gluing invariants are preserved by actions of the events
in the renement.
In order to ensure that the models of the distributed are live and eventually
makes progress we need to prove that Event-B models are non-divergent and
enabledness preserving [10].
3. Non-Divergence : In an incremental development approach using Event-B,
new events and the variables can be introduced in the renement steps.
Each new event of the renement renes a skip event in the abstraction and
denes actions on the new variables. Proving the non-divergence requires us
to prove that the new events do not take control forever.Veri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4. Enabledness Preservation : By enabledness preservation, we mean that when-
ever some events (or group of events) is enabled at the abstract level then
the corresponding events (or group of events) are eventually enabled at the
concrete level.
Existing B tools [2,10] generate proof obligations due to consistency and
renement checking and they provide an environment to discharge them using
automatic prover or by interaction. To ensure liveness in Event-B models we need
to prove that models of distributed system are Non-Diergent and Enabledness
preserving.
3 Event-B Models of Distributed Transactions
Our system model consist of sets of sites and data objects.We considered two
types of transactions namely, Read-only and Update Transaction. In our model
we considered read anywhere, write everywhere approach. A read-only transac-
tion read the data locally while the update transactions are processed within the
framework of a two phase commit protocol [7] to ensure global atomicity. Two
update transactions are said to be in conict if atleast one data object appears
in write set of both transactions. To meet the strong consistency requirements,
conicting transactions need to be executed in isolation. We ensure this prop-
erty by not starting a transaction at a site if any conicting update transaction
is active at that site. The commit or abort decision of a global transaction Ti
is taken at the coordinator site within the framework of a two phase commit
protocol. A global transaction Ti commits if all Tij commit at Sj. The global
transaction Ti aborts if some Tij aborts at Sj.
A formal renement based approach using Event-B to model and analyze
distributed transaction is given in [11]. In our abstract model, an update trans-
action modies the abstract one copy database through a single atomic event.
In the renement, an update transaction consists of a collection of interleaved
events updating each replica separately. The transaction mechanism on the repli-
cated database is designed to provide the illusion of atomic update of a one copy
database. Through the renement proofs, we verify that the design of the repli-
cated database conforms to the one copy database abstraction despite trans-
action failures at a site. We assume that the sites communicate by a reliable
broadcast [6] which eventually deliver messages without any ordering guaran-
tees.
3.1 Abstract Transaction States
In our abstract model of transactions, the global state of an update transac-
tions is modelled by a variable transstatus. The variable transtatus is dened as
transtatus 2 trans ! TRANSSTATUS, where TRANSSTATUS=fCOMMIT,
ABORT, PENDINGg. The transstatus maps each transaction to its global state.
With respect to an update transaction, activation of following events change the
transaction states.Veri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conicting transaction is already active at that site. Following guard of Begin-
SubTran(tt) event ensures that a sub-transaction of tt starts at a site ss when
no active transaction tz running at ss is in conict with tt :
(ss 7! tz) 2 activetrans ) objectset(tt) \ objectset(tz) = ?
As a consequence of the occurrence of this event, transaction tt becomes
active at site ss and the sitetransstatus of tt at ss is set to pending. Instead of
giving the specications of all events of the renement in the similar detail, brief
descriptions of the new events in this renement are outlined below.
{ BeginSubTran(tt) : This event models starting a sub-transaction at a site.
The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to pending.
{ SiteAbortTx(ss,tt) : This event models local abort of a transaction at a site.
The transaction is said to complete execution at the site. The status of the
transaction tt at site ss is set to abort.
{ SiteCommitTx(ss,tt) : This event models precommit of a transaction at a
site. The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to precommit.
{ ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt) : This event models abort of a precommitted trans-
action at a site. This event is activated once the transaction has globally
aborted. The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to abort. The trans-
action is said to complete execution at the site.
{ ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt) : This event models commit of a precommitted
transaction at a site. This event is activated once the transaction has globally
committed. The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to precommit. The
replica at the site is updated with the transaction eects and the transaction
is said to complete execution at this site.
4 Non-Divergence
New events and the variables can be introduced in the renement. Each new
event of the renement renes a skip event and denes a computation on new
variables. In order to show that the model of system is non-divergent, we need to
show that the new events introduced in the renement do not together diverge,
i.e., run forever. For example, if the new events in the renement, such as,
BeginSubTran, SiteAbortTx or SiteCommitTx take the control forever then the
events of global commit/abort are never activated and a global commit decision
may never be achieved. In order to prove that the new events do not diverge, we
use a construct called variant. A variant V is a variable such that V 2 N, where
N is a set of natural numbers. For each new event in the renement we should be
able to demonstrate that the execution of each new event decrease the variant
and variant never goes below zero. This allow to us prove that a new event
cannot take control forever, since a variant can not be decreased indenitely.
The state diagram for a concrete transaction state transitions at a site is
shown in the Fig. 2. A transaction state at each participating site is rst set toVeri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decrease the variant by one and change the status of a transaction from a pend-
ing state to precommit or abort state. Since activation of the new events in the
renement decrease the variant, the rank of state is changed from three to zero
such that variant(tt) will always be greater than or equal to zero.
In order to prove that the activation of the new events given in the Fig. 2
do not diverge, we need to prove that the changes in the state of a transaction
at a site corresponds to the decrement in the rank from three to zero. Also,
the variable variant is decreased each time a new event in the renement is
activated. Thus, we construct invariant property involving variable variant that
need to be satised by the action of the events in the renement. This property
is given the Fig 3.
8t  (t 2 trans )
variant(t)  ( 3  card(SITE   activetrans
 1[ftg]
+2  card(sitetransstatus(t)
 1[fpendingg]
+1  card(sitetransstatus(t)
 1[fprecommitg]
+0  card(sitetransstatus(t)
 1[fcommit;abortg]
)
)
Fig.3. Invariant used in variant Proofs
In this expression, activetrans 1[ftg] returns a set of sites where transaction
t is in active state. Similarly, sitetransstatus(t) 1[fpendingg] returns a set of site
where a transaction t is in pending state. In order to prove that the new events in
the renement do not diverge, we have to show that the above invariant property
on a variable variant holds on the activation of the events in the renement. In
order to prove this invariant property we need to add invariants (1) and (2) to
the model. The invariant (1) states that if a transaction t is not active at a site
s then the variable variant is greater than or equal to zero. The invariant (2)
state that the variable variant is greater than or equal to zero if the status of a
transaction t at site s either precommit, pending, abort or commit.
8(s;t)  (t 2 trans ^ s 2 SITE ^ (s 7! t) = 2 activetrans ) variant(t)  0) (1)
8(s;t)  (t 2 trans ^ s 2 SITE^
sitetransstatus(t)(s) 2 fpending;precommit;abort;commitg ) variant(t)  0)
(2)
Once the above invariants are added to the model, the B Tool generate
the proof obligations associated with the events in the renement. These proof
obligations may be discharged using automatic/interactive prover of the tool.
By discharging the proof obligations we ensure that the model of distributed
system is non-divergent. The same strategy can be followed for each level of the
renement chain of Event-B development to show non-divergence in development
of distributed systems.8 Veri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5 Enabledness Preservation
With respect to the liveness, the freedom from deadlock is an important property
in a distributed database system. In our model of transactions, it require us
to prove that each transaction eventually completes the execution, i.e., either
it commits or aborts. It require us to prove that if a transaction completes
the execution in the abstract model of a system, then it must also complete
the execution in the concrete model. We ensure this property by enabledness
preservation. The enabledness preservation in Event-B requires us to prove that
the guards of the one or more events in the renement are enabled under the
hypothesis that the guard of one or more events in the abstraction are also
enabled [10]. Precisely, let there exist events Ea
1, Ea
2 ..., Ea
n in the abstraction
and a corresponding event Er
i in the renement renes the abstraction event Ea
i .
The events Hr
1, ..., Hr
k are the new events in the renement. A weakest notion
of enabledness preservation can be dened as follows :
Grd(Ea
1) _ Grd(Ea
2)::: _ Grd(Ea
n)
)
Grd(Er
1) _ Grd(Er
2)::: _ Grd(Er
n) _ Grd(Hr
1) _ Grd(Hr
2)::: _ Grd(Hr
k) (3)
Weakest notion of enabledness preservation given at ( 3) state that if one of
the event in the abstraction is enabled then one or more events in renement
are also enabled. The strongest notion of the enabledness is dened at ( 4). It
state that if the event Ea
i in the abstraction is enabled then either the rening
event Er
i is enabled or one of the new events are enabled.
Grd(Ea
i ) ) Grd(Er
i ) _ Grd(Hr
1) _ Grd(Hr
2)::: _ Grd(Hr
k) (4)
A concrete model outlined in Fig. 2 may be deadlocked due to the race conditions,
i.e., if updates are delivered to the sites without any order. To ensure that all
updates are delivered to all sites in the same order, we need to order the update
transactions such that all sites deliver updates in the same order. It may achieved
if a site broadcasts an update using a total order broadcast [12]. In next section,
we outline how the enabledness preservation properties relates to our model of
transactions in the presence of abstract ordering on the update transactions.
Abstract Ordering on Transactions : To ensure that our concrete model
of transactions does not block and makes progress, we introduce a new event
Order in the renement. The very purpose of introducing new event Order(tt) is
to ensure that the transactions are executed at all sites in a predened abstract
order on the transactions. The abstract ordering on the transaction can be re-
alized by introducing explicit total ordering [6] on the messages in the further
renements. To model an abstract order on the transactions we introduce new
variables tranorder and ordered typed as follows:
tranorder  trans $ trans
ordered  transVerication of Liveness Properties in Distributed Systems 9
A mapping of the form t1 7! t2 2 tranorder indicate that a transaction t1 is
ordered before t2, i.e., at all sites t1 will be processed before t2. The set variable
ordered contains the transactions that has been ordered.
Proof Obligations for Enabledness Preservation : In this section, we out-
line the proof obligations to verify that the renement is enabledness preserving.
Our objective is a prove that if a transaction completes in the abstraction then
it also completes in the renement. The weakest notion of enabledness preserva-
tion1 given at (3) requires us to prove following :
Grd(StartTran(t) _ CommitWriteTran(t) _ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
) Grd(StartTran(t))
_ Grd(Order(t))
_ Grd(BeginSubTran(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t;s))
_ Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
_ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t)) (5)
The property given at (5) is not sucient as it state that if one of the events in
StartTran, AbortWriteTran or CommitWriteTran are enabled in the abstraction
then one of the rened event or the new events are enabled in the renement. It
does not guarantee that if a transaction t completes in abstraction then it also
completes in the renement. What we need to prove is that if either AbortWrite-
Tran or CommitWriteTran in the abstraction is enabled then one of the rened
event or new event in the renement are enabled. According to the strongest
notion of enabledness preservation given at (4), it requires us to prove (6), (9)
and (10).
Grd(StartTran(t))
) Grd(StartTran(t))
_ Grd(Order(t))
_ Grd(BeginSubTran(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t;s))
_ Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
_ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t)) (6)
The property at (6) state that if the guard of StartTran event is enabled
then the guard of rened StartTran or the guards of new events are enabled.
1 An event E in the abstract model is dened as E
 in the re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This property is provable due to following observations.
Grd(StartTran(t) ) Grd(StartTran(t)) (7)
In order to prove this property, the following proof obligation needs to be dis-
charged. This proof obligation is trivial and can be discharged by the automatic
prover of the tool.
8t(t 2 TRANSACTION ^ t = 2 trans ) t = 2 trans) (8)
Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
) Grd(StartTran(t))
_ Grd(Order(t)
_ Grd(BeginSubTran(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t;s))
_ Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
_ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t)) (9)
The property at (9) state that if the guard of CommitWriteTran event is
enabled than the guard of rened CommitWriteTran or the guards of new events
are enabled. This property is too storing to prove due to following reasons. A
transaction may not commit in the renement until some other transaction either
do not commit or abort. It may happen due to the interleaved action of the events
in renement such that some other transaction has started at some site and the
commit of the transaction t depends on commit or abort of other transaction.
Also, due same reasons the property at (10) is also not provable.
Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
) Grd(StartTran(t))
_ Grd(Order(t)
_ Grd(BeginSubTran(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t;s))
_ Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
_ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t)) (10)
We observe that the proof obligations constructed due to the weakest notion
of the enabledness preservation are not sucient to prove that if a transaction
completes in abstraction then it also completes in the renement. Also, we ob-
serve that strongest notion of enabledness preservation is too strong to prove
this property, therefore unprovable. What we really need a notion of enabled-
ness preservation that is stronger than the weakest notion(see property 3) and
weaker than the strongest notion(see property 4). This can be dened as below.Verication of Liveness Properties in Distributed Systems 11
1. If the event StartTran is enabled in the abstraction then it is also enabled
in the renement.
2. If the completion event, i.e.,either CommitWriteTran or AbortWriteTran
events are enabled in the abstract model then these completion events are
also enabled in the renement.
We have already outlined that the rst property is preserved by the our model
of transaction given as property (7). For second property, we further construct
the property given at (11).
Grd(CommitWriteTran(t)) _ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
) Grd(Order(t))
_ Grd(BeginSubTran(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t;s))
_ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t;s))
_ Grd(CommitWriteTran(t)
_ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t) (11)
We observe that property (11) is also not provable because a transaction t
cannot complete its execution until some other conicting transaction, already
active, do not complete. Using the same strategy outlined above we construct
a new property to illustrate that if the events corresponding to a completion
of a transaction tx in the abstraction are enabled then the new events Order,
BeginSubtran, SiteCommitTx, SiteAbortTx are enabled for other transactions ty
or the rened Complete events are also enabled for tx. Once these properties
are added to the Event-B model of distributed transactions, the B Tool gen-
erate proof obligations due to these additions. In order to discharge new proof
obligations we are required to add fresh invariants until the B prover is able to
discharge all proof obligation.
The proof obligations outlined above are specic to the model of the trans-
actions, however, using the same strategy the proof obligations for the other
models of the distributed systems may be generated. Discharging these proof
obligations ensures that the model of distributed system is enabledness preserv-
ing. It can be noticed that same strategy should be used to formulate the proof
obligations for each level of renement.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we addressed the issue of liveness in the B models of distributed
system. The safety and liveness are two important issues in the design and de-
velopment of distributed systems. The safety properties express that something
bad will not happen during system execution. A liveness property expresses that
something good will eventually happen during the execution. With regards to
the safety properties, the existing B tools generate proof obligations for consis-
tency and renement checking. These proof obligations may be discharged by12 Veri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using automatic/interative provers of B Tools. To ensure livness in the models
of distributed systems, it is useful to state that the model of the system under
development is non-divergent and enabledness preserving. In order to show that
the new event in the renement do not take control forever, i.e., models are non-
divergent, we outlined a method for construction of an invariant property on
variant. To ensure that a concrete models also make progress and do not block
more often than its abstraction, it is necessary to prove that if an abstract model
makes a progress due to the activation of events then the concrete model also
make a progress due to the activation of the events in the renement. We ensure
this property by enabledness preservation. A method for construction of proof
obligations for ensuring enabledness preservation is outlined in this paper. The
proof obligations corresponding to both non-divergent and enabledness preserv-
ing can be discharged using automaic/interactive prover of B Tools to ensure
that models of distributed system are live.
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